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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the plight of small businesses in New York
City has become a contentious topic. Although the city and its
current mayoral administration share a long-standing commitment to affordable housing,1 the city’s small businesses—an
integral and defining feature of the urban landscape—have suffered immensely. In the past decade, local establishments
have largely given way to a homogenous landscape of empty
storefronts and national chain stores.2 The loss of local business occurs with such staggering frequency that there is an
entire thriving blog subculture documenting their “vanishing” 3
and the Center for an Urban Future publishes an annual report on the growth of chain businesses in the city.4 Pro-development advocates assert that this “vanishing” merely
1 It is worth noting that the success of this commitment is open to debate.
Compare William Neuman, De Blasio Says City Will Hit Affordable-Housing Goal 2
Years Early, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/
nyregion/de-blasio-affordable-housing-goal-2-years-early.html
[https://
perma.cc/K8V3-L2LG] (reporting that the de Blasio administration would meet its
goal of creating or preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing by 2024 two
years early, in 2022), with J. David Goodman, De Blasio Expands Affordable
Housing, but Results Aren’t Always Visible, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/nyregion/de-blasio-affordable-housing-newyork-city.html [http://perma.cc/JE49-3BRU] (explaining that many beneficiaries
of the Mayor’s affordable housing plan are angry with the extensive rezoning the
city promoted to build new housing, and do not feel that their apartments are
indeed “affordable,” despite qualifying as such under the Mayor’s plan). Even if
the apartments are adequately affordable for residents, the demand for them
vastly overshadows the supply. Cf. Goodman (noting that the city held lotteries
for approximately 5,000 apartments in 2017, but that tens of thousands of residents apply for such apartments).
2
See Christian González-Rivera, Ctr. for an Urban Future, STATE OF THE
CHAINS (2017) [hereinafter STATE OF THE CHAINS], https://nycfuture.org/pdf/
CUF_StateOfChains_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA5L-WA96].
3 See, e.g., JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C., http://vanishingnewyork.blogspot.
com/ [http://perma.cc/FXG2-39QR] (extensively documenting and lamenting
the disappearance of small businesses in New York). Jeremiah Moss, the owner of
the blog, recently published a book on the same topic, which The New York Times
describes as “chronicl[ing] how (and why) a city of diners and delis morphed into a
string of interchangeable blocks filled with forgettable stores of the sort that could
be found in a Long Island strip mall.” Ronda Kaysen, A Book from a Blogger About
Disappearing New York, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/11/realestate/a-book-from-a-blogger-about-disappearing-newyork.html [http://perma.cc/V7T5-S2YB]; see also EV GRIEVE, http://evgrieve.com/ [http://perma.cc/QZ7F-MHJ2] (local news blog from Manhattan’s
East
Village documenting, among other events, the closure of small businesses).
4
See STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2.
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represents a sort of creative destruction that the city naturally
experiences.5 However, critics point out that most of these
businesses were perfectly viable—even thriving—but were
pushed out by a local commercial law regime that favors large
landlords and strips small commercial tenants of all bargaining
power.6 This imbalance, they suggest, is what results in commercial rents that can increase close to ten-fold when it comes
time to renew leases.7
In response to this perceived injustice, small business advocates have proposed the Small Business Jobs Survival Act
(SBJSA) in the New York City Council.8 The Act proposes various protective measures and seeks to increase small commercial tenant bargaining power.9 However, the bill’s current
incarnation languished at the committee stage until October
2018, when it finally received its first hearing.10 A primary
reason for the near decade-long inability of the bill to make it to
hearings—and the current uncertainty as to whether it will
make it to a vote—in City Council is the position, held by some
council members and real-estate advocates, that the proposed
5 See Brad Hoylman, Our Community Cannot Afford the Cost of ‘High-Rent
Blight,’ CHELSEA NOW (July 5, 2017), http://chelseanow.com/2017/07/our-com
munity-cannot-afford-the-cost-of-high-rent-blight/
[http://perma.cc/FZG9QJ9U].
6 See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Law that Would Help NYC from Being Strangled by
Chain Stores Is Deserted by City Council, VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.villagevoice.com/2016/09/30/law-that-would-help-nyc-from-being-stran
gled-by-chain-stores-is-deserted-by-city-council/
[http://perma.cc/D2U2K5AX].
7 See, e.g., Steven Kurutz, Bleecker Street’s Swerve from Luxe Shops to Vacant Stores, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/
fashion/bleecker-street-shopping-empty-storefronts.html?mcubz=1 [http://
perma.cc/XD8U-D9T5] (noting that, in 2008, rent for a unit on Bleecker Street
skyrocketed from $7,000 per month to $45,000 per month as soon as the tenant’s
lease expired).
8 See SBJSA, TAKE BACK NYC (2015), http://takebacknyc.nyc/sbjsa/
[https://perma.cc/XG58-FB7B].
9 See Small Bus. Cong., The Small Business Jobs Survival Act, SAVE NYC
JOBS, https://www.savenycjobs.com/jobs-survival-act [http://perma.cc/KVH8SSRA] (proposing legislation to empower small businesses in the city and combat
their decline).
10 See Jenny Dubnau, Why New York Needs Commercial Rent Control, METROPOLITAN COUNCIL ON HOUSING (Sept. 2015), http://metcouncilonhousing.org/news_
and_issues/tenant_newspaper/2015/september/why_new_york_needs_commer
cial_rent_control [http://perma.cc/A97B-LMAQ]; see also Tanay Warerkar, City
Council Debates Small-Biz Bill at Heated Hearing, CURBED NY (Oct. 23, 2018, 9:11
AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2018/10/23/18013348/small-business-jobs-survival-act-mom-pop-nyc-council [https://perma.cc/5RXS-RFA7]. It is worth noting that various versions of the SBJSA have been floating around City Council
since the 1980s. Needless to say, no version of the bill made it to the floor of City
Council for a vote, despite what is at times widespread support. See infra Part III.
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legislation is unconstitutional.11 However, public debate on
the bill and related measures has reemerged in the recent mayoral election and its aftermath.12
This Note surveys the current status of small businesses
and commercial tenant law in New York City and discusses
whether or not the SBJSA and commercial rent control are
constitutional in light of current regulatory takings jurisprudence. Part I surveys the history of land use regulations in the
city, the introduction of residential rent control, and the city’s
brief flirtation with commercial rent control in the mid-20th
century. Part II explains the decline and current state of small
businesses and the commercial law regime in the city, including the SBJSA proposal. Part III describes the origins and current state of regulatory takings law in light of the Supreme
Court’s 2017 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin. Part IV evaluates
whether the SBJSA is constitutional in light of that recent takings jurisprudence. Finally, this Note concludes that the
SBJSA would constitute a regulatory taking when it comes to
commercial spaces that are free-standing or under separate
ownership from the residential units above them in mixed-use
structures. However, when a commercial space in a mixed-use
building is under the same ownership as the residential units
in that building, then the SBJSA would not constitute a regulatory taking. This appears to be a paradoxical result, but it is
one that is nonetheless grounded in current regulatory takings
law. Ultimately, the possibility of the municipal government
having to provide compensation to even some commercial landlords for regulatory takings would likely render the SBJSA impracticable and prohibitively costly. Therefore, this Note
recommends that City Council and small-business advocates
seek other avenues to curb the decimation of small business in
11 Cf. Abigail Savitch-Lew, Trepidation Around Proposal for Regulating Store
Rents in NYC, CITYLIMITS.ORG (June 13, 2016), https://citylimits.org/2016/06/13
/trepidation-around-proposal-for-regulating-store-rents-in-nyc/
[http://
perma.cc/6RAL-3HKJ] (quoting a local real estate advocate, John Banks, as referring to the SBJSA as unconstitutional).
12 See, e.g., David Cruz, Fiery Debate for 14th Council District Seat Addresses
Past and Present, NORWOOD NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.norwoodnews.org/
id=24139&story=fiery-debate-for-14th-council-district-seat-addresses-past-andpresent/ [http://perma.cc/5MMD-EYW2] (documenting a heated debate over the
SBJSA between candidates for a City Council district in the Bronx in the lead-up
to the 2017 municipal elections); see also, e.g., Ed Litvak, (Voter Guide) Mary
Silver – City Council District 2, LO-DOWN (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:54 AM), http://
www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2017/09/voter-guide-mary-silver-city-councildistrict-2.html [http://perma.cc/FN3H-KCWQ] (explaining the pro-SBJSA position of a candidate for the City Council district encompassing Murray Hill in
Manhattan).
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the city. This conclusion has implications far beyond New York
City, affecting any municipality that wishes to introduce commercial rent regulation.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

History of Land Use Regulations in New York City

The earliest years of New York City were defined by dense,
mixed-use residential development below Wall Street. However, beyond the small community on the southern tip of Manhattan, most of the island was sprawling, meandering farm
land with no apparent order.13 Manhattan and its surrounding
locales, today’s boroughs, mostly remained this way until the
introduction of the Commissioner’s Plan of 1811. The plan
imposed the grid system upon the entire island, opening pathways to development and presaging the city’s colossal growth
in the coming century.14 Indeed, in 1810, a year before the
Commissioner’s Plan was enacted, the city’s population was
96,373.15 By 1920, following decades of heavy immigration,
the city’s population was 5,620,048.16 Naturally, the previously bucolic farmland north of Wall Street gave way to largescale development to accommodate the teeming masses of the
new metropolis. But despite the guiding hand of the grid system, the new development was unruly. The absence of a comprehensive zoning scheme resulted in crowded, smoggy
neighborhoods comprising residential, commercial, and industrial developments in close proximity to one another.17 Further, as buildings were able to grow ever-higher with the
13 See Jessica Dailey, When Wall Street Was a Wall: A 1660 Map of Manhattan, CURBED N.Y. (May 6, 2013, 11:50 AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/5/6/
10246784/when-wall-street-was-a-wall-a-1660-map-of-manhattan [http://
perma.cc/5Y6D-U8ZX].
14 See Artis Q. Wright, Designing the City of New York: The Commissioners’
Plan of 1811, N.Y.C PUBLIC LIBR. (July 30, 2010), https://www.nypl.org/blog/
2010/07/30/designing-city-new-york-commissioners-plan-1811
[http://
perma.cc/M8X7-Y847].
15 N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Total and Foreign-Born Population: New York
City, 1790–2000, CITY OF N.Y. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download
/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/historical-population/1790-2000_nyc_total_
foreign_birth.pdf [http://perma.cc/WD5S-VEDV].
16
Id.
17 See, e.g., Kelly Richman-Abdou, Jacob Riis: The Photographer Who Showed
“How the Other Half Lives” in 1890s NYC, MASHABLE (May 21, 2017), https://
mymodernmet.com/jacob-riis-how-the-other-half-lives/
[https://perma.cc/
R53Z-2SCB] (describing and showcasing the work of Jacob Riis, pioneering
photojournalist and muckraker whose work documented the squalor of Manhattan’s Lower East Side in the 1890s).
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introduction of the steel-frame building and skyscraper, many
streets became drowned in darkness.18
It was in response to these concerns that the nation’s first
comprehensive municipal zoning code was created: New York’s
1916 Zoning Resolution.19 The 1916 resolution regulated the
height and size of new construction and established a separation of residential and industrial areas.20 As zoning caught on
nationally, it faced numerous legal challenges; however, the
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of zoning regulations in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co.21
B.

Modern Era

In the years after Euclid, the city and New York State began
to experiment with more expansive regulation of real estate. In
fact, the city had a commercial rent control law that was enacted by the state in 1945 in response to wartime pressures.22
As a recent article on the debate over commercial rent control
explains:
In 1945, responding to the wartime emergency that had
spurred skyrocketing rents and eviction rates, the New York
State legislature enacted a law that limited when a commercial tenant could be evicted and instituted restrictions on
rent increases. Landlords could not raise rents by more than
15 percent above 1943 or 1944 rent levels if it would lead to a
profit of more than 8 percent. The law was challenged repeatedly in the courts, and ultimately the legislature allowed
it to expire in 1963.23
18 See Lisa Santoro, The Equitable Building and the Birth of NYC Zoning Law,
CURBED N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2013, 12:37 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/3/15/
10263912/the-equitable-building-and-the-birth-of-nyc-zoning-law
[http://
perma.cc/5THU-65KD] (describing the construction of the massive Equitable
Building in Lower Manhattan). The design and construction of the steel-frame
structure was entirely unregulated and, at the time of completion, it was the
largest office building in the world; the public backlash against the structure was
a major impetus in introducing the nation’s first comprehensive zoning plan in
New York. Id.
19 See id.; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Zoning Background, CITY OF N.Y.
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/background.page [http://perma.
cc/Y4KM-JZHJ].
20
Bd. of Estimate and Apportionment, 1916 Building Zone Resolution, CITY OF
N.Y. (last updated Mar. 2004), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/down
load/pdf/about/city-planning-history/zr1916.pdf [http://perma.cc/7TKDS54R].
21 See 272 U.S. 365, 395, 397 (1926) (holding that zoning ordinances are
constitutional exercises of state police power as long as they bear a rational
relation to the health, safety, and general welfare of the community).
22
See Dubnau, supra note 10.
23
Savitch-Lew, supra note 11.
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Thus the concept of commercial rent control is not entirely
foreign to New York City. The debate on commercial rent control was rekindled in the 1980s, when early forms of the SBJSA
emerged; however, it was not until recently, when the survival
of its small businesses was in serious jeopardy, that the city
revisited the idea of commercial rent regulation in earnest.24
II
THE DECLINE OF SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEARCH FOR
AN EXPLANATION
A.

Vanishing Mom and Pop

In an editorial published on November 19, 2017, the editorial board of The New York Times pointed to the “scourge of
store closings that afflicts one section of the city after another.”25 Something strange appears to be happening in New
York: a metropolis that was once a city of neighborhoods, each
containing “shops that met most residents’ basic needs, from
groceries to shoes, from newspapers to haircuts,” appears to be
vanishing.26 Some commentators seem to suggest that the city
changes by nature and people are merely getting frustrated
with what they see as the old New York vanishing to yield to the
new.27 Yet the facts are indisputable: New York City’s small
businesses have been disappearing with staggering
frequency.28
24 Although the SBJSA’s current incarnation, see infra Part III, was the first
modern, comprehensive plan introduced in City Council to protect small business
through a form of commercial rent regulation, the topic has been debated in city
politics for quite some time. See, e.g., Pro & Con: Should the City Have Commercial
Rent Control?; Croissants, Cobblers, and Free-Market Forces, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
1985),
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/07/weekinreview/pro-con-shouldcity-have-commercial-rent-control-croissants-cobblers-free-market.html?page
wanted=all&mcubz=1 [http://perma.cc/B2MR-75AK] (describing a 1980s, Kochera debate on commercial rent control and pointing to problems facing small
businesses, such as “[w]hen the rent on a store triples,” that are only different
from today’s problems in degree). For a more in-depth discussion of the problems
facing small businesses in the 2010s, see infra Part II.
25 Editorial, Why Is New York Full of Empty Stores?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/opinion/nyc-empty-stores.html
[http://perma.cc/A25T-ZRSD].
26
Id.
27 See, e.g., Justin Davidson, Which New York is Yours? A Fierce Preservationist and a Pro-Development Blogger Debate, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (May 1,
2015),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/05/new-york-landmarkslaw-debate.html [https://perma.cc/FAB2-ZLFJ] (debate between preservationist
Jeremiah Moss of Jeremiah’s Vanishing New York and popular pro-development
blogger Nikolai Fedak of New York YIMBY (Yes in My Back Yard)).
28 Cf., e.g., Tatiana Schlossberg, Bodegas Declining in Manhattan as Rents
Rise and Chains Grow, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
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The decline in small business has coincided with a massive
increase in the amount of commercial storefront vacancies 29
and the amount of chain stores in the city. The Center for an
Urban Future’s 2017 State of the Chains report shows that the
city (all five boroughs) had 7,317 national chains in 2017, an
increase of 1.8% from the prior year and the ninth consecutive
year of net increases in national chain stores throughout the
city.30 Brooklyn, which has been experiencing rapid gentrification, saw a 3.1% increase, the largest increase in any of the five
boroughs. As of December 2017, Dunkin’ Donuts was the national retailer with the most locations in New York City, maintaining 612 stores.31 In short, the number of chain stores in
New York is growing at an alarming rate. Given that these
stores are renting predominantly in pre-existing retail space
(rather than in new construction), it means that the spaces
they occupy were once home to smaller, long-standing local
businesses.32
Interestingly, it is not only small businesses in lower-income parts of the city that are hurting; the “vanishing” phenomenon is prevalent in many of the city’s ritzier locales, even
going so far as to affect some of the larger chains that might

2015/08/04/nyregion/bodegas-declining-in-manhattan-as-rents-rise-andchains-grow.html?_r=2 [http://perma.cc/AR7N-GK2B] (documenting the decline
in bodegas in the city).
29 See Vacant N.Y.C., http://map.vacantnewyork.com/ [http://perma.cc/
L39Y-VX27] (interactive map documenting the vacant storefronts throughout the
city).
30
STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2.
31 Id. (noting that this is also the ninth year Dunkin’ Donuts topped the list of
chains in New York City with the most locations). As of 2017, the chains with the
most growth in New York City were food-related, with retailers in that category
comprising 41% of New York City’s growth in national chain locations in the last
decade. It is worth noting that some cities, such as San Francisco, have recognized and attempted to curb the growth of chains that harm local businesses by
enacting restrictions on “formula businesses.” See generally Mark Bobrowski, The
Regulation of Formula Businesses and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 44
URB. LAW. 227, 233–240 (2012) (providing background on the emergence and
purposes of restrictions on formula businesses).
32 Indeed, in its review of the book Vanishing New York: How a Great City Lost
Its Soul, the book form of the blog discussed infra subpart III.B, The New York
Times distills Jeremiah Moss’s essential claim to be that, “New York, in its current
. . . form, is at ease with a disturbingly paradoxical identity, as a place that says
yes to every branch of Dunkin’ Donuts and no to the people whose fortunes
consign them to working there.” See Ginia Bellafante, Tracking the Hyper-Gentrification of New York, One Lost Knish Place at a Time, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/books/review/vanishing-new-york-jeremiah-moss.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/UD8Y-JGTH].
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have initially wrought the change.33 Bleecker Street in the
West Village, whose western section was one of Manhattan’s
most coveted commercial strips, tells a representative tale. On
the few western blocks of Bleecker Street, 44 long-standing,
small neighborhood businesses have closed since 2001.34
Bleecker Street was one of the most famous retail streets in
Manhattan, renowned for its small, whimsical, and creative
shops.35 As the neighborhood began to gentrify, it became a
luxury shopping district where the once-creative shops were
replaced by high-fashion designer stores “selling $400 Tshirts.”36 As Steven Kurutz explains in his article in the Times
about Bleecker’s story:
During its incarnation as a fashion theme park, Bleecker
Street hosted no fewer than six Marc Jacobs boutiques on a
four-block stretch, including a women’s store, a men’s store
and a Little Marc for high-end children’s clothing. Ralph
Lauren operated three stores in this leafy, charming area,
and Coach had stores at 370 and 372-374 Bleecker. Joining
those brands, at various points, were Comptoir des Cotonniers (345 Bleecker Street), Brooks Brothers Black Fleece
(351), MM6 by Maison Margiela (363), Juicy Couture (368),
Mulberry (387) and Lulu Guinness (394). . . . Today, every
one of those clothing and accessories shops is closed. 37

He further remarks:
In the heart of the former shoppers’ paradise—the five-block
stretch running from Christopher Street to Bank Street—
more than a dozen retail spaces sit empty. Where texturedleather totes and cashmere scarves once beckoned to passers-by, the windows are now covered with brown construction paper, with “For Lease” signs and directives to “Please
visit us at our other locations.”38
33 See STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2; see also Kurutz, supra note 7
(documenting the decline of small business in the West Village, an upscale neighborhood in downtown Manhattan).
34 BRAD HOYLMAN, BLEAKER ON BLEECKER: A SNAPSHOT OF HIGH-RENT BLIGHT IN
GREENWICH VILLAGE AND CHELSEA, https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/
press-release/attachment/bleaker_on_bleecker_0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F58T9AU8] (NY State Senate report documenting the causes and rampancy of small
business decline and empty storefronts in downtown Manhattan).
35 See Kurutz, supra note 7 (explaining that Bleecker was once home to many
unique small stores, including “antiques stores . . . a pet store called the Bird
Jungle; the Biography Bookshop; and Nusraty Afghan Imports, where an immigrant named Abdul Nusraty had been selling rugs, jewelry and antiquities since
1979”).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
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As this phenomenon became noticeable throughout the entire city, people began to ask what was happening—and how it
could be fixed.
B.

Reasons for the Decline of Small Business

In looking for explanations for the marked decline in small
business in the city, it is common to hear that the retail landscape is simply changing due to online shopping and that these
businesses are no longer viable.39 However, what is surprising
about many of the closures is that the shuttered businesses
were, in fact, thriving and beloved local institutions—places
that anchored their communities. The fact that many of these
businesses were financially viable suggests that there must be
a different cause for the decline of small business in the city
other than the changing retail landscape.40
And, indeed, there is another cause: exorbitant rent increases when it comes time for businesses to renew their leases
have played a leading role in the decline of small business in
New York.41 As State Senator Brad Hoylman, who represents
the district comprising Manhattan’s Chelsea neighborhood,
explains,
A trend has emerged: landlords, in the pursuit of higher and
more reliable rents, don’t renew the lease of longtime businesses. They then keep the space vacant, holding out for the
payout of a long-term lease from [a] luxury retail or corporate
chain, which can take months, or even years. The result is a
glut of empty storefronts or chain stores and high-end national retailers, to the detriment of local small businesses.42

Thus it is not uncommon to see landlords increase rents
ten-fold on otherwise healthy businesses that are simply unable to withstand the increase.43 Jeremiah Moss has
fastidi39 See Why Is New York Full of Empty Stores?, supra note 25 (“On one level,
there’s just so much the city can do. Online shopping is here to stay, and it takes
an inevitable toll on brick-and-mortar stores.”).
40 For a seminal discussion of the importance of small business in urban
communities, see generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES (1961).
41 See Edward Helmore, New York’s Vanishing Shops and Storefronts: ‘It’s Not
Amazon, It’s Rent,’ GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2017/dec/24/new-york-retail-shops-amazon-rent
[http://
perma.cc/M6RW-36BR]; see also Why Is New York Full of Empty Stores?, supra
note 25.
42
Hoylman, supra note 5.
43
See, e.g., Luis Ferré-Sadurnı́, Sunshine Cinema, a Beloved Manhattan Theater, Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/
21/nyregion/sunshine-movie-theater-closing.html?smid=TW-nytmetro&smtyp=
cur [http://perma.cc/PJX9-BQGL] (providing a recent example of the closure of a
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ously documented the death of beloved local businesses in his
popular blog, Jeremiah’s Vanishing New York.44 In his decade
of maintaining the blog, Moss has documented the closure of
thousands of small businesses in New York City, many of
which had large and dedicated clienteles but suffered exorbitant rent hikes.45 As Tim Wu noted in The New Yorker:
In the West Village, rent spikes are nearly universally reported as the reason so many storefronts have closed over the
past few years. Cafe Angelique reportedly closed when its
sixteen-thousand-dollar rent increased to forty-two thousand dollars. A Gray’s Papaya [a long-standing local hot dog
mini-chain] on Eighth Street closed after its owner reported a
rent increase of twenty thousand dollars per month.46

Some are beginning to characterize this phenomenon of
rampant vacancy as “high-rent blight.”47 In other words, prospopular and financially healthy independent movie theater in Manhattan’s Lower
East Side). The theater was forced to close after its building was sold to a new
developer who planned to raise the rent well beyond its previous $8,000 per
month rate at the end of its lease; the theater could easily make its previous rent,
but not the increased price. Id.
44
See JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C., supra note 3.
45 Particularly noteworthy is Moss’s story of the “vanished” Cafe Edison in
Manhattan’s Theater District. Cafe Edison was a beloved cafe popular with the
show-business crowd. See Michael Schulman, An Activist For New York’s Momand-Pop Shops, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/26/an-activist-for-new-yorks-mom-and-pop-shops [http://
perma.cc/X559-4EA8]. Moss broke the news that the beloved cafe would be
forced to close when its landlord denied it a lease renewal after 34 years in the
space. Jeremiah Moss, Cafe Edison, JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C. (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://vanishingnewyork.blogspot.com/2014/11/cafe-edison.html [http://
perma.cc/U6BD-QKNY]. In a remarkable effort to save the business and demonstrate that the cafe had sufficient support in the community to make its rent,
Moss organized a lunch mob with some 600 people, which garnered the express
support of Manhattan Borough President Gale Brewer, New York State Senator
Brad Hoylman, and Manhattan District 3 Council Member Corey Johnson. The
protests received global coverage on NPR and the BBC. The support was not
enough to convince the landlord to renew the lease. See Jeremiah Moss, Cafe
Edison is Closing, JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://vanishingnewyork.blogspot.com/2014/12/cafe-edison-is-closing.html
[http://
perma.cc/K3LV-7NGW] (discussing Cafe Edison’s dedicated clientele); see also
Tim Wu, Why Are There So Many Shuttered Storefronts in the West Village?, NEW
YORKER (May 24, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/whyare-there-so-many-shuttered-storefronts-in-the-west-village [http://perma.cc/
XH66-G8FB] (discussing rent hikes).
46
See Wu, supra note 45.
47 See, e.g., id. (“Abandoned storefronts have long been a hallmark of economic depression and high crime rates, but the West Village doesn’t have either of
those. Instead, what it has are extremely high commercial rents, which cause an
effect that is not dissimilar. ‘High-rent blight’ happens when rising property values, usually understood as a sign of prosperity, start to inflict damage on the city
economics that Jane Jacobs wrote about.” (referencing Jane Jacobs, famed urbanist and West Village denizen who wrote extensively in the 1960s on the small
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perous districts of the city bear the physical hallmarks of
“blight” not because they are impoverished, but rather because
few, if any, businesses can afford the rent; these neighborhoods are victims of their own ostensible success in attracting
astronomically high rents. In the words of the inimitable perennial candidate Jimmy McMillan: “The rent is too damn
high.”48
III
BIRTH OF THE SMALL BUSINESS JOBS SURVIVAL ACT
A.

The Act

As the situation for New York’s small businesses becomes
increasingly dire, the question of what, if anything, should be
done has become a contentious topic, garnering recognition
from some of the city’s leadership.49 It was with this issue in
mind that legislators introduced the SBJSA to City Council.
The most noteworthy extant proposal to address the crisis of
small businesses in the city, the Act “applies to independently
owned and operated New York City businesses, with no more
businesses that made the neighborhood such a success)); see also, e.g., Ilya
Marritz, There Seem to Be a Lot of Empty Storefronts, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/there-seem-be-lot-empty-storefronts-problem/
[http://perma.cc/KQB8-ZNP5] (discussing high rent blight in the Manhattan’s
East Village and more generally); Alanna Schubach, Storefront Map: Where Have
NYC’s Retail Shops Gone?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Mar. 24, 2017), https://
www.brickunderground.com/live/vacant-storefront-nyc
[http://perma.cc/
KM5S-ULQE] (discussing, with the founder of Vacant New York, the website’s
interactive map of empty storefronts and the concept of high-rent blight); Alissa
Walker, Full Bank Accounts, Empty Storefronts: The Economics of High-Rent Blight,
GIZMODO (May 26, 2015, 5:40 PM), https://gizmodo.com/full-bank-accountsempty-storefronts-the-economics-of-1706993230 [http://perma.cc/BHB6-PN2X]
(discussing high-rent blight).
48 Christian Royer, Rent Is Too Damn High Party Debate, YOUTUBE (Oct. 18,
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcsNbQRU5TI [https://perma.cc/
UKF8-8QND].
49 See, e.g., Sarina Trangle & Ivan Pereira, Council Speaker Melissa MarkViverito Releases Proposals to Bolster Retail Sector, AMNEWYORK (Dec. 14, 2017,
12:01 AM), https://www.amny.com/real-estate/mark-viverito-retail-proposals1.15444258 [http://perma.cc/68GE-GP3L] (discussing efforts by the exiting City
Council speaker to combat the decimation of small business in the city). For an
example of this contentiousness, one need only look to the public outrage over the
proposed startup “Bodega,” which sought to “disrupt” the corner bodega business
by placing around the city what are essentially glorified vending machines that
allow customers to pay using their iPhones. Many members of the public found
the name “Bodega” to be offensive in light of the precarious position of small
businesses (particularly actual bodegas) in the city’s current commercial climate.
See Emily Nonko, Bodega Owners Don’t Think New Yorkers Will Shop at a Vending
Machine Called ‘Bodega,’ VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.vil
lagevoice.com/2017/09/18/bodega-owners-dont-think-new-yorkers-will-shopat-a-vending-machine-called-bodega/ [http://perma.cc/4RP8-US6J].

2019]

REGULATORY TAKINGS

541

than 100 employees, where such business is not dominant in
its field.”50 Under the SBJSA, commercial tenants have a guaranteed right of renewal of their 10-year leases, unless the tenant fails to pay rent in a timely manner or engages in another
behavior in breach of contract with the landlord.51 Then:
If the landlord agrees to renew the lease, he and the tenant
can negotiate the rent or either party can compel non-binding
mediation. If after 90 days of negotiations and/or mediation
there is no agreement, the tenant must initiate arbitration in
order to retain the right to renew. The arbitrator’s rent determination is binding [unless the tenant refuses to pay that
amount in rent] and based on considerations including, the
rental market in the area, the condition of the space and
services provided, the landlord’s maintenance costs, and the
extent to which the business is bound to a particular
location.52

If the tenant does not agree to the rent determined by the
arbitrator, then the tenant can remain in possession of the
space at a rent no greater than a 10% increase than the average
of the previous year’s rent.53 If a new prospective tenant approaches the landlord with a bona fide offer, then the original
tenant has the right of first refusal and can choose to sign a
lease at the rate agreed between the landlord and the prospective bona fide purchaser.54 In other words, the landlord cannot
simply enlist a third party to make an above-market offer solely
for the purpose of pushing out the original tenant.
B.

Legislative Attempts to Pass the SBJSA

Although its current iteration is from 2009, the SBJSA has
existed in one form or another in City Council since the
1980s.55 Remarkably, no City Council speaker has ever permitted the Act to make it to the floor of City Council for a vote.56
50 See Dina Botwinick et al., Saving Mom and Pop: Zoning and Legislating for
Small and Local Business Retention, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 607, 628–29 (2010) (describing the SBJSA but referring to it as the “Small Business Act”).
51 See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, LEGIS. RES.CTR., http://
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1825175&GUID=AFE9C1835929-43FB-80AE-C7595CB610BD [http://perma.cc/2GSV-GJQ3] (official version of the bill as introduced in City Council four years ago).
52
Botwinick et al., supra note 50, at 628–29 (footnotes omitted).
53 See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, supra note 51 (SBJSA § 22905(e)(3)(g) as introduced).
54
See id.
55 See Dennis Lynch, Oops, They Did It Again! Council Snubs S.B.J.S.A.,
VILLAGER (Oct. 6, 2006), http://thevillager.com/2016/10/06/oops-they-did-itagain-council-snubs-s-b-j-s-a/ [http://perma.cc/8GGG-TERF].
56
Id.
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The first hearing on this 2009 iteration took place in October
2018; however, at present, it is uncertain if it will make it to a
floor vote, despite what appears to be widespread support.57
It is not entirely clear why a bill with widespread support
cannot make it to the floor of City Council for a vote, or even
why it took so long for a simple hearing. Opponents of the bill
in City Council and on the Real Estate Board of New York, a
real estate trade association, suggest that it is not within the
power of government to impose controls over commercial property leases.58 Proponents of the bill, on the other hand, take
the more cynical view that the City Council is beholden to
powerful real estate interests in the city. As Max Rivlin-Nadler
for The Village Voice argued:
[City Council] won’t even allow the legislation to go before a
committee hearing, even though 27 councilmembers support
it. Why? In short, because it would supremely piss off the
powerful real estate interests that all major politicians in New
York City must answer to, which makes it a total nonstarter.
Debating the Small Business Jobs Survival act would start a
conversation about the future of the city that no ambitious
politician actually wants to have.59

It is for precisely this reason that “the [SBJSA] has become
symbolic for its proponents of the Council’s inability—or unwillingness, depending [on] who you ask—to tackle the inequities in commercial tenant-landlord relationships in this city.”60
C.

Renewed Calls for the SBJSA

As pointed out in the prior section, the SBJSA has languished since City Council legislators introduced its current
iteration in 2009. However, as noted in Part II, the health and
status of small businesses in the city have become considerably more precarious in the interim.61
Recognition of this fact has led to renewed calls from various municipal leaders and activists for passage of the SBJSA.
Debate over the dangers facing small businesses and the ap57 Id. (explaining that the current iteration has “27 sponsors, or one sponsor
over the 26-vote halfway mark needed to pass it in the 51-member Council.”); see
Warerkar, supra note 10 (documenting the October 2018 City Council hearings).
58
Id.
59 Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 6. This article was written before the October
2018 hearing, but the essential point—that some believe City Council is beholden
to real estate interests—remains the same.
60
Lynch, supra note 55.
61 See generally supra Part II (explaining the accelerated rate at which small
businesses have been disappearing since the bill was introduced in 2009).
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propriate solution to those dangers played a role in New York’s
recent municipal elections.62 The result of the election has
been the empowerment of a municipal government that claims
it is progressive and finally granted a hearing on the SBJSA. 63
Whether it will ultimately vote on and pass the bill remains to
be seen.
Unsurprisingly, the possibility that the SBJSA will become
a reality in City Council is still being met with considerable
backlash, with many of the city’s real estate interests suggesting that the Act is not only undesirable but also possibly
unconstitutional.64 One of the primary arguments against the
SBJSA is that it is a regulatory taking in light of takings jurisprudence.65 Opponents believe that commercial rent regulations so dramatically diminish the value of a landlord’s
property that their imposition constitutes a regulatory taking
for which landlords must be compensated.66 The following
Parts of this Note examine doctrinal developments in regulatory
takings law and their potential implications for the passage of
the SBJSA.
IV
THE LAW OF TAKINGS
A.

Origin of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, the
“Denominator Problem,” and Conceptual Severance

The Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause” states that, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
62 See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 12 (documenting heated debate over SBJSA
between City Council candidates in the Bronx); Marni Halasa, The City Council
Must Vote on the S.B.J.S.A., VILLAGER (Oct. 19, 2017), http://thevillager.com/
2017/10/19/the-city-council-must-vote-on-the-s-b-j-s-a/ [http://perma.cc/
8APL-SYVV] (City Council District 3 candidate expressing support for the SBJSA);
Litvak, supra note 12 (explaining pro-SBJSA position of a city council candidate
from Murray Hill); Rich Bockmann, Majority of City Council Speaker Candidates
Back Commercial Rent Control, REAL DEAL (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2017/11/02/majority-of-city-council-speaker-candidates-backcommercial-rent-control/ [http://perma.cc/5DWA-HEXS] (noting that six out of
eight candidates for Speaker of City Council supported some form of commercial
rent control, including the ultimate victor, Corey Johnson).
63 See, e.g., Warerkar, supra note 10; Editorial, ‘A New Progressive Era’ in
New York City, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/
01/opinion/bill-de-blasio-inauguration.html [http://perma.cc/Z7CU-YMVD] (explaining de Blasio’s commitment to “a new progressive era” in his inaugural
speech, in which he was sworn in by Senator Bernie Sanders). At the inauguration, the city’s reelected public advocate and comptroller spoke and “emphasiz[ed]
their progressive credentials.” Id.
64
See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 55.
65
See Savitch-Lew, supra note 11.
66
See id.

544

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:529

compensation.”67 Beginning with the seminal case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922,68 regulatory takings doctrine is the “idea that a regulation’s diminution of private
property value can result in a taking” that falls under the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition and thus requires compensation
from the government.69
The controversy in Mahon involved a regulation in Pennsylvania coal mining country that allowed the surface, support
layer, and ore below the ground of an estate in land to be split
among multiple owners. Some forty years prior to the litigation, the defendant, Pennsylvania Coal Company, sold the surface rights to a parcel of land, retaining the rights to the
support and ore beneath it in accordance with state law and
waiving liability for any damage caused by the coal mining
beneath the surface.70 Later, Pennsylvania passed the Kohler
Act, making it illegal to engage in below-surface mining that
could cause any structure above ground to sink. The Kohler
Act thus destroyed any previously existing contract or property
rights relating to the ore beneath the surface.71 The defendant
coal company, faced with the lawsuit seeking to enjoin its mining, asserted that this regulation went beyond the mere incidental fluctuations of property values that are the inevitable
result of government regulation; rather, the company argued,
this regulation rose to the level of a taking for which the company must be compensated if the regulation were to be constitutional.72 The Court ultimately held that the Kohler Act
constituted a taking, insofar as it wholly destroyed the defendant’s property interest. Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes recognized that:
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that
a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.73
67

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
69
See Hannah Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006
Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1522 (2007).
70 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; see also Laura J. Powell, The Parcel As A
Whole: Defining the Relevant Parcel in Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases, 89
WASH. L. REV. 151, 156 (2014) (surveying the history of regulatory takings
doctrine).
71
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412–13.
72
See id. at 400–04.
73
Id. at 415–16.
68
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In short, Holmes and the majority of the Court held that, in
cases involving regulatory takings, the presiding court should
look to any diminution in value that is caused by the regulation
in question.74 However, diminution in value must by nature be
a diminution as a fraction of some entire value. What, precisely, that entire value is became a critical issue whose resolution would have a significant impact on the outcome of takings
cases.
Holmes and the majority evaluated diminution in value
relative to the value of the property right in the ore.75 Taken
from this perspective, the diminution in value was the total
value of the ore, making this a clear case of when the regulation
“goes too far” and “will be recognized as a taking.” 76 The dissent, penned by Justice Brandeis, asserts that the diminution
in value must take into account the value of the property as a
whole:
[V]alues are relative. If we are to consider the value of the
coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it
with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the
value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole
property. The rights of an owner as against the public are not
increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not
be greater than the rights in the whole.77

The interpretive dispute between Holmes and Brandeis—
that is, the question of what exactly is being diminished by the
government regulation—has come to be known as the “denominator problem.”78 “Conceptual severance” is the term given to
Holmes’ notion that a parcel of land comprises parts and the
diminution in value can be evaluated in relation to a “severed”
part that is the target of the regulation in question. Brandeis,
on the other hand, suggests that we must look at what has
come to be known as the “parcel as a whole.”79 Of course,
depending on how the “denominator” at issue is defined, the
effect of the regulation can be enormous (and thus easily found
to be a taking), or small (and thus unlikely to be considered a
taking).
74

See id. at 413, 415.
See id. at 414–16.
76
See id.
77
Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
78
See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test,
118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 622–24 (2014).
79
See id.
75
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The Rejection of Conceptual Severance

The Court did not confront the denominator problem headon until many decades later, with its landmark decision in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.80 In Penn
Central, the then-newly conceived New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission designated Grand Central Terminal
as a landmark, preventing the owners of the terminal from
constructing a 50-story modern office building on top of the
historic station.81 Penn Central, the company that owned
Grand Central, sued New York City, claiming that the
landmark designation and concomitant restrictions on its
property use constituted a taking of the company’s air rights
for which it must be compensated.82 Thus, the applicable “denominator problem” in Penn Central was whether the diminution in value should be viewed in relation to merely the air
rights (i.e., conceptual severance), in which case it would be
considerable diminution, or in relation to the air rights in addition to the historic structure and rail operations (i.e., parcel as
a whole), in which case the diminution would be less severe.83
Ultimately, the Court rejected the conceptual severance doctrine. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected
a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole ............ 84

The Court continued, pointing out that although takings
inquiries are “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,” 85 there are
nonetheless several factors that are particularly important,
namely:
80 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). As an aside,
Penn Central shows us that New York City’s regulation of its built landscape has
long implicated and influenced takings law.
81
Id. at 115–17.
82
Id. at 119.
83 Penn Central argued that, if the Court would conceptually sever its air
rights above the property, the restriction on its use of air rights above Grand
Central constituted a complete diminution in value. However, the Court pointed
out that the air rights could still be sold to neighboring buildings, albeit at a much
lower profit than could be realized if Grand Central itself could use them. See id.
at 136–37.
84
Id. at 130–31.
85
Id. at 124.
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The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action [important]. A “taking” may more readily be
found when the interference with the property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.86

Thus, in Penn Central, the Court expressly rejected the notion
of conceptual severance espoused by Justice Holmes in the
Mahon decision.
In a case decided in the years following Penn Central, the
Court added some more nuance to takings doctrine, distinguishing between physical and nonphysical government invasions. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,87 the
Court held that when the character of a government action is a
permanent physical occupation of property, the Court will find
that a taking has occurred, regardless of whether the invasion
serves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.88 It is worth noting, however, that
there can be physical invasions that are not necessarily permanent and are thus not subject to the per se taking rule. Such
regulations fall instead under Penn Central’s ad hoc balancing
test.89
C.

The Murr Decision

In its 2016 term, the Court made another foray into regulatory takings law in the case Murr v. Wisconsin,90 elaborating on
the rule articulated in Penn Central. This recent decision set
forth a new test for determining what the “denominator” is in
takings analysis.
Murr involved siblings who inherited adjacent lots in a
scenic area along the St. Croix River in Wisconsin.91 Under
Wisconsin law, individual lots could not be used for separate
building sites unless they had at least one acre of land suitable
86

Id. (citations omitted).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
88 See id. at 426, 434–35, 438 (holding that a nondescript but permanent
wire installation on plaintiff-landlord’s apartment building in New York constituted a taking).
89
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124–25.
90
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
91
Id. at 1940.
87
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for development.92 Further, adjacent lots under common ownership could not be sold or developed as separate lots if they
did not meet the requirement of having at least one acre of land
suitable for development.93 The Murrs sought to build a cabin
on one of the lots and sell the other lot to fund the construction
of the cabin.94 However, because neither of the lots contained
more than an acre of land suitable for development, the local
rule prohibited them from selling or developing either parcel
individually, effectively merging them into one parcel.95 The
Murrs brought suit against the State of Wisconsin, alleging
that this functional merger diminished the value of their property and thus constituted a regulatory taking.96 The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court on a denominatorproblem issue—namely, whether the diminution in value
should be viewed as a portion of one of the Murrs’ lots or
both.97 If the denominator was only one of the lots, then the
diminution would be quite large and would most likely constitute a regulatory taking.98 However, if the denominator were
both the lots taken as one merged lot, then the diminution in
value would be less severe and less likely to constitute a
taking.99
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy pointed out that,
“[a] central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory taking jurisprudence . . . is its flexibility.”100 Because of this flexibility, “the
Court has declined to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to
the portion of property targeted by the challenged regulation.”101 Kennedy further noted:
[Another] concept about which the Court has expressed caution is the view that property rights under the Takings Clause
should be coextensive with those under state law. Although
property interests have their foundations in state law, . . .
States do not have the unfettered authority to “shape and
define property rights and reasonable investment-backed exId.
Id.
94
Id. at 1941.
95
Id.
96
See id.
97
See id. at 1943–44.
98
See id. at 1941–42.
99 Id. The trial court analyzed the diminution in value out of the two lots
combined and found that the diminution was thus not sizable enough to constitute a taking. Id. at 1941. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial
court properly focused on the Murrs’ “property as a whole.” Id.
100
Id. at 1943.
101
Id. at 1944.
92
93
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pectations,” leaving landowners without recourse against unreasonable regulations.102

It is for these reasons that the Court held that “no single
consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the
denominator.”103 In other words, Murr put forth a flexible, ad
hoc balancing test. However, the Court recognized that the
inquiry must be guided by some clear factors in order to be
workable. The Court thus proceeded to amend the Penn Central test to set forth the factors that must be considered in
determining the denominator in takings analysis.104 Namely,
[C]ourts must consider . . . [T]he treatment of the land under
state and local law; the physical characteristics of the land;
and the prospective value of the regulated land. The endeavor should determine whether reasonable expectations
about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or,
instead, as separate tracts.105

Stated differently, the denominator test is an objective test
of whether reasonable expectations about property ownership
would lead a landowner to anticipate his holdings to be treated
as one parcel or as separate tracts. The three factors enumerated above are used to guide the analysis. Using these new
factors, the Court affirmed the ruling of the state courts and
found that the regulations at issue did not effect a taking.106
V
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SBJSA UNDER TAKINGS
ANALYSIS
Takings law has the potential to be damning for the viability of any commercial rent regulation proposal, particularly the
102 Id. at 1944–45 (citation omitted) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 626–27 (2001)).
103 Id. at 1945.
104 See id. at 1945–46. For a discussion of how the Murr test might not have
made the denominator inquiry clearer at all, see generally Richard A. Epstein,
Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up Takings
Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 183–89 (2017) (explaining that Murr “dodged the hard questions latent in applying the ‘parcel-as-awhole’ test”).
105 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
106 See id. at 1948–50.
The Court reasoned that the property’s treatment
under state law made it reasonable to expect that the lots would be treated as a
single property. Further, the physical characteristics (namely, the contiguousness) of the lots makes it reasonable to expect that their potential uses might be
limited. Finally, the restriction on either individual lot is mitigated by the benefits
of having one large, integrated property.
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SBJSA. Despite the pessimistic position of proponents of the
SBJSA that the New York City Council is nothing more than a
shill for the real estate industry, the argument that commercial
rent control is unconstitutional (absent just compensation)
might hold some water. In short, if commercial landlords in
New York are restricted in the ways in which they can use their
property under the Act, they will be able to make some compelling legal claims that the Act constitutes either a categorical,
per se taking or an ad hoc regulatory taking that requires the
balancing test laid forth in Penn Central and Murr.
It is first necessary to evaluate whether the government
regulation that would be instituted by the SBJSA is more accurately characterized as a permanent physical invasion or as a
nonphysical balancing of societal interests. If the SBJSA is
best characterized as the former, then it will likely constitute a
categorical, per se taking. If the SBJSA is the latter, then it is
subject to the ad hoc balancing outlined in Penn Central and its
progeny.
A.

The SBJSA and Categorical Takings

Although Loretto’s physical taking rule is somewhat narrow, there is an argument to be made that it applies in the
commercial rent regulation context: when the government
forces a landlord to allow a tenant to remain at a lower rent
than the landlord would prefer (or could otherwise get at fair
market value), it constitutes a per se taking. This argument
does seem compelling on its face. However, the SBJSA’s fundamental requirements that small commercial tenants have a
right of renewal and that there exist a more tenant-friendly
negotiation process do not seem to be the type of physical invasions that are within the contemplation of Loretto, which dealt
with a government installation of a wire on the plaintiff’s
building.107
Furthermore, even if the SBJSA is a physical invasion by
the government, it is doubtful that it constitutes a permanent
physical invasion. Proponents of the bill would likely point out
that it is irrelevant because, no matter what, the landlord seeks
to have a tenant in the space. Thus, having a tenant that
simply pays less rent is not truly a permanent physical invasion. In other words, regardless of the outcome, there would be
a tenant in that space. Further, the SBJSA permits the land107
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–22
(1982).

2019]

REGULATORY TAKINGS

551

lord to get a new tenant if there is a bona-fide offer after negotiations with the previous tenant collapse.108 This latter point
tilts in favor of the argument that even if there is an invasion, it
is not a permanent one.
On the other hand, opponents of the bill might suggest that
landlords should not be forced to offer their space to tenants
when they no longer find it economically viable. The reality is
that even previous tenants can stay in place indefinitely. Opponents of the SBJSA will likely assert that to require landlords
to do so—that is, to require them to continue allowing an undesired tenant who can indefinitely renew the lease to occupy the
space—is precisely the type of permanent physical invasion
that is within the contemplation of Loretto. To analogize the
situation to Loretto, one wire kept on a landlord’s building by
the government and another wire kept on the building by the
landlord are two very different things, even if they appear to be
the same.
Although the latter argument is compelling, ultimately it
does not seem as if the physical presence of a particular commercial tenant is the harm. Rather, the harm alleged is solely
economic: the inability of the landlord to collect as high a rent
on the property as desired. In other words, opponents of the
SBJSA believe that, under the Act, landlords suffer a nonphysical taking that renders them unable to fully use their property
to seek higher, market rate rents on commercial space. Such
an argument must be evaluated under the Penn Central and
Murr line of cases.
B.

Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings and the SBJSA

If the SBJSA is merely adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good, rather than imposing a permanent physical invasion on property, then it is
subject to the ad hoc balancing and denominator analysis set
forth in Penn Central and Murr.109 As suggested above, the
denominator question can have an enormous—indeed, most
likely a dispositive—effect on whether the Act constitutes a
taking.
At the outset, it is worth noting that commercial
storefronts in New York City can either be owned as (1) freestanding commercial buildings, (2) as separate, individual par108
109

See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, supra note 51.
See supra Part III.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

552

[Vol. 104:529

cels that happen to be part of a larger building,110 or (3) as part
of a unified, mixed-use parcel that includes both residential
and commercial space under a single owner.111 As the following subsections explain, the first two will be treated similarly
when it comes to denominator analysis, but the latter must be
treated differently.
1.

Freestanding Commercial Buildings and Commercial
Spaces Owned Separately in Mixed-Use Buildings

In addition to freestanding commercial buildings, New
York is home to innumerable mixed-use residential-commercial structures that are spliced up, with the commercial spaces
and residential spaces under separate ownership.112 In such a
situation, there is no complicated denominator problem implicated by the SBJSA. In other words, there is no ambiguity in
what the parcel as a whole is; there is no way to conceptually
sever one portion of the property from the other. Thus, in
evaluating whether the SBJSA would constitute a regulatory
taking when applied to small businesses located on these types
of properties, it is only necessary to apply the Penn Central
analysis to the value of the commercial space.
If the SBJSA were to pass in City Council, owners of these
types of properties would have a very compelling argument that
the Act constitutes a taking under the Penn Central analysis.
As evidenced by the astronomically higher rents collected by
landlords after the leases of small business expire (often tens of
times higher), it is clear that landlords’ “investment-backed
expectations”113 are dramatically curtailed if they are forbidden
from attracting market rents. For instance, a landlord who is
able to attract a market rent ten times higher than that paid by
a current, small business tenant would be able to show that
the SBJSA diminishes the value of the property by 90%.
Although proponents of the SBJSA may argue that the
benefit to society of ensuring that small businesses can stay in
their spaces outweighs this cost, the reality is that the SBJSA
does not truly guarantee that they will be able to stay. Rather,
it merely gives them the right of renewal and the ability to go to
110 One such example is a ground-floor commercial condominium in a large,
mixed-use building in which the residential condominiums above are owned separately from the commercial condominium below.
111 See SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, N.Y.C., A STRONGER,
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK ch. 4 at 70–71 [hereinafter REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY].
112 See id.
113 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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arbitration with their landlord.114 In light of this, it seems
likely that owners of freestanding commercial spaces and owners of commercial spaces that are owned separately from the
mixed-use structures in which they are housed will be able to
show that the SBJSA constitutes a taking, almost entirely diminishing the market value of their property. This alone is
enough to make the SBJSA prohibitively expensive because it
is not feasible to compensate the landlords for this loss.
2.

Commercial Spaces in Mixed-Use Structures Under
Unified Ownership

Mixed-use structures, containing both commercial and
residential spaces, can be—and commonly are—part of a building under unified ownership.115 These types of properties present an altogether different inquiry, reintroducing the need for
denominator analysis.
Opponents of the SBJSA who own mixed-use buildings,
housing both commercial and residential spaces, will likely argue that the appropriate denominator here is the commercial
space alone, rather than the commercial space plus the various
residential units above. This is because if the denominator is
merely the commercial space, they will be able to show almost
complete diminution in value, as with the types of property in
subsection one above. That is, if we are concerned with the
diminution in value only of the commercial space whose use is
severely restricted by the SBJSA, then it seems likely that the
SBJSA would constitute a taking. On the other hand, if the
denominator in this takings analysis is the value of the commercial space in addition to the various (very expensive) residences above it in the mixed-use building, then the diminution
will be comparatively small. Stated more clearly, the landlord’s
inability to realize the maximal value that the market can get
for a commercial space will be deemed to have less of an impact
in evaluating whether a taking has occurred. If the diminution
is comparatively small, then it is almost certain that the SBJSA
will not constitute a taking under the Penn Central test.
It is difficult to see why this situation is any different from
Penn Central’s failed argument to have the court conceptually
sever its air rights from the value of the parcel as a whole. The
rejection of conceptual severance set forth in Penn Central
seems to guarantee that the diminution in value under the
114
115

See supra subpart III.B.
See REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, supra note 111.
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SBJSA would be considered relative to both the commercial
and residential space together. In other words, to say that
commercial space in a mixed-use building should be considered separately from residential space in the same building
seems very much akin to the argument that Grand Central’s
airspace should be considered separately from the building itself—an argument that the Court squarely rejected. Thus, it
does not seem like the SBJSA would constitute a regulatory
taking for owners of mixed-use buildings that house both commercial and residential units.
However, recognizing this, any rational landlord in a world
in which the SBJSA passed would simply attempt to restructure the building ownership such that the commercial and residential space were entirely separate, rather than one parcel.116
It is in this situation that the Murr test becomes relevant. In
other words, a landlord who owns two separate parcels—commercial and residential—housed in one building will argue that
they should be treated as separate. This is precisely like the
Murrs’ argument that their adjacent parcels should be treated
as separate.117 In this instance, the parcels are simply vertically rather than horizontally contiguous pieces of property.
If the parcels are treated separately, then the SBJSA would
diminish the value of the commercial space enough that it
would likely constitute a taking. Per Murr, then, one critical
question in such a situation arises: Would a landlord’s reasonable expectations about property ownership lead the landowner to anticipate the commercial and residential spaces in a
mixed-use building to be treated as one parcel or as separate
tracts? If it is the former, the SBJSA will likely not constitute a
taking; if it is the latter, then it almost certainly will.
To evaluate this denominator problem, it is necessary to
use the factors laid out in Murr.118 Turning first to the treatment of the land under state and local law, proponents of the
bill will likely succeed in pointing out that ownership of commercial and residential space in a single building would reasonably lead the owner to expect these components to be
treated as one. This somewhat blends into the second factor:
the physical characteristics of the land. In this scenario, we
are dealing with a single building that has simply been subdivided into different pieces. The commercial and residential
116
For instance, by turning the building into a condominium in which the
commercial and residential units are owned as separate parcels unto themselves.
117
See supra subpart III.C.
118
See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct 1933, 1944–45 (2017).
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portions are vertically contiguous to one another—they are literally housed under one roof and owned by the same person,
thus making it even more reasonable to expect them to be
treated as one than the adjacent tracts in Murr. Turning finally
to the prospective value of the regulated land, this factor seems
to lean towards viewing them as one parcel. When the commercial and residential components are considered as one parcel, their combined value would be worth significantly more
than each parcel separately, and any diminution in the value of
the commercial space would not affect the value of the residential space.119 Indeed, they would exhibit the same “complementarity” as the tracts in Murr.120
In summary, it can be said that a landowner who owns
both the commercial and residential portions of a mixed-use
structure would reasonably expect the two parts to be treated
as one tract. The result is somewhat paradoxical: the mere fact
that separate commercial and residential components of one
building happen to be owned by the same person will likely
mean that the regulation of the commercial space does not
result in a taking. On the other hand, it would constitute a
taking if the commercial space and residential space were
owned by separate individuals. Nonetheless, this seems to be
the result that current takings law compels under Murr.
CONCLUSION
The decline in small businesses is one of the most significant and important challenges that the city faces in the coming
years. After some (albeit unfinished) success in addressing the
housing affordability crisis in the city during its first term, the
de Blasio administration should turn its focus to the equally
precarious position of the city’s small businesses. Although it
is difficult to imagine a better impetus for action than the endangerment of thousands of New Yorkers’ livelihoods, stronger
commercial rental protections also serve the interests of the
community more generally. This appears to be a fact that is
increasingly recognized in City Council.121
In order to combat this, some City Council legislators have
proposed the SBJSA. However, the bill has struggled to get to
the floor of City Council for a vote despite enjoying support
from most councilmembers. This failure is largely because of
opponents’ claims that the Act, without compensating
land119
120
121

See id. at 1948.
See id. at 1949.
See Lynch, supra note 55.
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lords for the large diminution in value of their property, constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking.
In light of the current state of regulatory takings law, this
argument likely holds true for commercial parcels that are freestanding or under different ownership from the mixed-use
structures in which they are located; however, it is likely that
the SBJSA does not constitute a regulatory taking when commercial and residential portions of a mixed-use building are
under the same ownership.
Although the SBJSA might not amount to a regulatory taking when applied to every commercial space in New York, its
application to even some of them would likely make it prohibitively costly. Thus, to address the rising affordability crisis for
New York’s small businesses, the city should instead find alternative solutions that do not involve forms of commercial rent
control. This could mean providing more subsidies to small
business owners directly, or it could mean providing tax and
other incentives to landlords to encourage rentals to small
businesses and discourage maintaining empty storefronts in
the city. This should provide important guidance to both New
York and other cities that are concerned with the state of small
businesses within their boundaries.
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